Abstract. In [17] , Zhu, et al. proposed a RSA-based password authenticated key exchange scheme which supports short RSA public exponents. The scheme is the most efficient one among all the RSA-based schemes currently proposed when implemented on low-power asymmetric wireless networks. We observe that its performance can further be improved by proposing two modifications. The first modification shortens the size of the message sent from the server to the client. The second modification dramatically reduces the size of the message sent from the client to the server and therefore can be used to reduce the power consumption of the client for wireless communications in a significant way. We also generalize our modified schemes and formalize the security requirements of all underlying primitives that the generic scheme is constituted. A new primitive called password-keyed permutation family is introduced. We show that the security of our password-keyed permutation family is computationally equivalent to the RSA Problem in the random oracle model.
Introduction
We investigate methods of providing efficient password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) for wireless communications between a low-power client and a powerful server. The objective of a password authenticated key exchange scheme is the same as a conventional authenticated key exchange scheme [5] : after two communicating parties successfully executing the scheme, each of them should have certain assurance that it knows each other's true identity (authentication), and it shares a new and random session key only with each other and the key is derived from contributions of both parties (key exchange). Unlike a
Related Work
There were many password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) schemes proposed in the last decade, especially recently [3, 9, 16, 4, 13, 11, 6, 8] 3 . Most of these schemes are based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange and perform large modular exponentiation operations which may take a long time to compute on a low-power device.
In [3] , Bellovin and Merritt investigated the feasibility of using RSA [14] to construct a PAKE. If the RSA public exponent is short, the encryption operation can be done efficiently. However, they also pointed out that an e-residue attack may be feasible if the receiving party has no way to verify whether a RSA public exponent is fraudulent or not, that is, to check if the public exponent is relatively prime to φ(n) without knowing the factorization of a RSA modulus n. To thwart this attack, the authors considered an interactive protocol for validating the public exponent. However, the protocol was found to be insecure [17] .
Two other RSA based schemes were proposed later in [12, 13] . The first one was later found to be insecure, while the second one has to use a large prime for the public exponent. This defeats the purpose of using RSA for low-power clients in our target applications because the computational complexity of performing a RSA encryption is no less than that of carrying out a modular exponentiation in a Diffie-Hellman key exchange based protocol.
In [17] , Zhu, et al. modified the interactive protocol in [3] and proposed a scheme which supports short RSA public exponents. The scheme is the most efficient one among all the RSA-based schemes currently proposed when implemented on low-power asymmetric wireless networks. For applications requiring moderate level of security, that is, if 512-bit RSA is used, the scheme takes less than 2.5 seconds of pure computation on a 16MHz Palm V and about 1 second for data transmission if the throughput of a network is only 8kbps. The computation time can be improved to 300 msec and the transmission time can also be reduced to 300 msec if caching is allowed. For applications where 1024-bit RSA is used, the total computation time of the client is estimated to be about 9 seconds according to the performance measurements of various cryptographic operations reported in [15] . It can be reduced dramatically to less than half second if the server's public key is cached at the client side. Since a client is usually communicating with an essentially fixed set of servers in most cases, the first 9-second protocol run can be considered as a one-time setup phase in a system.
Our Contributions
In [17] , the most time consuming part of the scheme is to check the validity of the server's RSA public exponent. The checking mechanism is a two-round interactive protocol which requires 1KB of data sent from the client to the server and another 200B of data sent from the server to the client, if 1024-bit RSA is used with the same configurations of all other parameters specified in [17] . In this paper, we propose two modifications of the interactive protocol for improving its efficiency. The first modification reduces the size of the message sent from the server to the client. It is a straightforward modification but reduces the transmission time, memory footprint and computation complexity all at the same time. The second modification reduces the size of the message sent from the client to the server significantly and hence entails much less power consumption for the low-power client in wireless communications than the original protocol in [17] as receiving radio signal requires much less power than transmitting some. Memory footprint at the client side is also minimized and other optimization techniques such as precomputation and caching are preserved.
On the security analysis, we generalize our modified schemes to a generic one and formalize the security requirements of all underlying primitives that the generic scheme is constituted. In the formalization, we introduce a new primitive called password-keyed permutation family to capture the features of the password related operations in our schemes. We also show that the security of our password-keyed permutation family is computationally equivalent to the RSA Problem in the random oracle model [2] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, the scheme proposed in [17] is reviewed. This is followed by the description of our two modifications in Sec. 3. In Sec. 4, we formalize our modifications by describing a generic scheme and specifying the security requirements of its underlying primitives. We conclude the paper in Sec. 5.
A RSA-based PAKE [17] -RSA-PAKE1
In [17] , Zhu, et al. proposed a RSA-based password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) scheme which supports short RSA public exponents. It is refined later in [1] to eliminate potential vulnerabilities of using symmetric encryption function. In the following, we review the refined scheme with some modifications so that the final session key is generated from the contributions of both communicating parties. We call the new scheme the RSA-PAKE1.
Define some integer k as a system-wide security parameter. Let two finitelength strings A, B ∈ {0, 1} * denote a powerful server and a low-power client, respectively. Let (n, e) be the RSA public key of A where n is the RSA modulus and e is the public exponent. Suppose A and B share a password pw ∈ P W where P W denotes a password space in which the password is chosen according to certain probability distribution. Let
k be distinct and independent cryptographically strong hash functions. The protocol proceeds as follows.
k and sends ((n, e), r A ) to B. Here we consider the RSA to be a trapdoor permutation over Z * n . The operation s e B ·π mod n can also be considered as a permutation of s e B mod n over Z * n where π ∈ Z * n . Observing that RSA is a trapdoor permutation also over Z n , we can use the following two permutation methods to compute z as well. Method 1:
B checks if (n, e) is a valid public key using an
Since not all randomly chosen elements in Z n after being encrypted are |n| − 1 bits long, this method is probabilistic. Method 2: Compute z as s e B + π mod n for all s B ∈ Z n . For simplicity, we skip detail discussions of these two methods and focus our attention on improving the efficiency of the Interactive Protocol for checking the validity of (n, e) in Step 2 above.
Improving the Interactive Protocol
In RSA-PAKE1 described above, there is an Interactive Protocol for checking the validity of public keys. To ensure that the RSA cryptosystem works correctly, the public exponent e has to be relatively prime to φ(n) where n is a RSA modulus. If e is a fraudulent value, an active attacker may be able to launch various e-residue attacks [3, 12, 13] .
The idea of using an interactive protocol to detect fraudulent values of e was first discussed in [3] . That is, after a verifier receives (n, e) from a prover, the verifier checks if n and e are odd. Then it picks N (say N = 10) integers Let h : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k be a collision-free hash function. After the verifier sends out {c i } 1≤i≤N , it stores {h(m i )} 1≤i≤N instead of {m i } 1≤i≤N in its memory. Similarly the prover sends back {h(m i )} 1≤i≤N . Due to the collision-free property of h, it is negligible to have h(m) = h(m ) for m = m . The checking mechanism of the interactive protocol is retained and the attack against the preliminary version is prevented. In addition, this also reduces the size of the reply in the Interactive Protocol and reduces the memory footprint of the verifier.
In the following, we describe two modifications. The first one shortens the size of the message sent from the server to the client, while the second one dramatically reduces the size of the message sent from the client to the server and hence saves much more power than the first one for the low-power client in wireless communications as transmitting radio signal requires much more power than receiving some.
Modification 1
After the verifier sends {c i } 1≤i≤N out, it stores h(m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m N ) in its memory. Similarly the prover sends h(m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m N ) back. This simple modification reduces the number of hash values to be stored and transferred from N to only one. It also reduces the hash operations at the client side from N times to one single hash operation.
In wireless communications, more power can be saved if the amount of data transmitted is reduced. In Modification 1, we reduce the amount of data needs to be received by the verifier (that is, the low-power client) while the amount of data sent by it remains the same. In Modification 2 below, we reduce the amount of data sent by the low-power client dramatically and therefore significantly reduce the power consumption of it.
Modification 2
For some odd integers n and e ≥ 3, let eRES = {y = x e mod n : x ∈ Z * n } be the e-residue set. If (e, φ(n)) = 1, then |eRES| ≤ φ(n)/3 since each e-residue has at least 3 e-th roots. When N elements are randomly picked in Z * n , the chance of having all of them in eRES is at most 3 −N . Base on this fact, we modify the Interactive Protocol as follows.
Define a random function H such that on inputs N , n, e, A, B, and two k-bit binary strings r 1 and r 2 , the function generates a sequence of N random elements in Z * n . This is denoted as (c 1 , c 2 , · · · , c N ) ← H(N, n, A, B, r 1 , r 2 ) . The prover (A) picks r 1 ∈ R {0, 1} k and sends (n, e, r 1 ) to the verifier (B). The verifier then replies with r 2 ∈ R {0, 1} 
Fig. 1. RSA-PAKE2
In this modification, all the N random numbers are generated dynamically using the random function H. Hence the low-power client B does not need to store any of them in the memory and the memory footprint is further minimized when compared with Modification 1.
On the computation complexity, the number of modular multiplications carried out in RSA-PAKE2 is no more than that in RSA-PAKE1 as well as in Modification 1. Hence the computation time is estimated to be similar to that of the previous variants. That is, it takes 2.5 seconds to compute on a 16MHz Palm V and reduces to 300 msec if the server's public key is cached for subsequent protocol runs after the first protocol run when N = 10 and 512-bit RSA is used. For stringent security requirement when 1024-bit RSA is used, the first run of the protocol requires 9 second of pure computation but all the subsequent runs with the same server can be reduced to less than half second.
On the power consumption, the low-power client receives N random numbers rather than sending N numbers as required in RSA-PAKE1 and Modification 1. In addition, only one k-bit long random number is sent by the client in the Interactive Protocol of RSA-PAKE2. This reduces the transmission time of the Interactive Protocol over a 8kbps network by 180 msec for k = 160. In addition, since receiving data consumes much less energy than sending data in wireless communications, for 1024-bit RSA, the client of RSA-PAKE2 spends only 20 msec in sending data in the Interactive Protocol, while the client of RSA-PAKE1 spends 1.28 seconds in sending data. RSA-PAKE2's approach of having the lowpower client dramatically reduce the message sent with the increase of message received can help the client to save power in a very significant way.
Formalization and the Generic Scheme
In this section, we generalize RSA-PAKE2 to a generic scheme and formalize the security requirements of all underlying primitives that the generic scheme is constituted. In the formalization, we introduce a new primitive called passwordkeyed permutation family to capture the features of the password related operations of RSA-PAKE1 (and the two modifications). We also show that these password related operations satisfy the security requirements of the passwordkeyed permutation family of the generic scheme if and only if the RSA Problem is hard.
The Public Key Encryption Function
From the conjectures that the RSA problem is hard and the RSA encryption primitive is a trapdoor one-way permutation over Z * n , we formalize the security requirement of the public key encryption function defined by a public key P K ∈ P ubK(k) in the generic scheme to be a trapdoor one-way permutation, given by E P K : S(P K) → S(P K) where S(P K) is the set of elements over which the trapdoor permutation is defined. P ubK(k) denotes the set of public keys with respect to k. In general, we can relax the requirement to allow any trapdoor one-way function as the encryption function.
The Password-Keyed Permutation Family
In Fig. 1 , z is computed as the encryption of a random element in Z * n followed by a modular multiplication with π where π ∈ Z * n is a function of the password pw with some nonces r A and r B and identification information. Similar to the definition of the public key encryption function above, we can also consider the modular multiplication as a permutation over the same set of elements as the public key encryption function. Define T : {0, 1} * → P wdK(k) to be a distinct and independent cryptographic hash function. We assume that the size of P wdK(k) is at least 2 k . Let P P K : P wdK(k) × S(P K) → S(P K) be a collection of permutations for every P K ∈ P ubK(k). For simplicity, we usually omit the superscript notation of the public key on P. We call P a passwordkeyed permutation family. For every π ∈ P wdK(k), we define a permutation P(π, x) . From these definitions, z is then computed in the generic scheme as z = P π (E P K (s B )) where s B ∈ R S(P K).
We now discuss the security requirements of P. The first requirement of P is distinctness. This means for every pair (π 1 , π 2 ) ∈ P wdK(k)×P wdK(k), π 1 = π 2 , and for any y ∈ S(P K), Pr[P π1 (y) = P π2 (y)] ≤ (k) where is some negligible function. It is not difficult to see that the purpose of having P be distinct is to prevent disturbing the probability distribution of picking pw from P W , which may provide an adversary with greater advantage in guessing the password.
Besides having P be distinct, we also require P to satisfy the following security requirement.
Definition 1. Given a trapdoor one-way permutation f : Dom(k) → Dom(k), a password space P W , and a hash function T : {0, 1}
* → P wdK(k) behaves like a random oracle, a distinct password-keyed permutation family
if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm E
T and for all sufficiently large k, which generate π 1 and π 2 , must not be the correct password. Hence no matter in which case, E can check at least two passwords in each impersonation. On the other hand, if E, impersonating B, constructs a pair (z, r B ) such that it obtains only one value x yielding z = P f π (f (x)) for some π ∈ Γ A,B,rA,rB , then this is not considered as a successful attack.
We consider this security requirement as a generalization of the 'associativity' problem discovered by Gong et al. in [7] and further exemplified by Jablon in [10] . The idea is also similar to the special characteristic of a password-entangled public-key generation primitive described in [8] . This limits the number of password guesses that the attacker can make to just one guess for each z, and for each run of a PAKE scheme.
Password-Keyed Permutation over Z * n . In RSA-PAKE2, both P wdK(k) and S(P K) are set to Z * n . Hence the password-keyed permutation family of RSA-PAKE2 can be written as P (n,e) : Z * n × Z * n → Z * n and is defined as (π, y) → y · π mod n for all y, π ∈ Z * n . It is obvious that P (n,e) is distinct. The following theorem says that it also satisfies Definition 1.
Theorem 1.
Given a RSA public key (n, e) such that the RSA Problem is hard, a password space P W , and a hash function T : {0, 1}
* → Z * n behaves like a random oracle, the password-keyed permutation (π, y) → y · π mod n is secure for all π, y ∈ Z * n . A proof is given in Appendix A.
The Generic PAKE Scheme
We now conclude the generalization and describe the entire generic scheme in the following. It is illustrated in Fig. 2 .
The Generic PAKE Scheme
1.
A generates a public key pair (P K, SK), picks r A ∈ R {0, 1} k and sends P K and r A to B. 2. B checks if P K is a valid public key. If it is invalid, B rejects the connection. Otherwise, it picks r B ∈ R {0, 1} k and s B ∈ R S(P K), and computes π = T (pw, A, B, r A , r B ) . It sends z = P π (E P K (s B )) and r B back to A, and destroys π from its memory. 
Concluding Remarks
The contributions of the paper can be divided into two parts. In the first part, we propose two modifications on a refined scheme of [17] . The modifications reduce the message size hence improve the network efficiency and memory footprint. More importantly, RSA-PAKE2 dramatically reduces the size of the message sent from the low-power client to the server. This saves a lot of battery power for a portable client from transmitting radio signal in wireless communications.
In the second part, we generalize RSA-PAKE1 and its modifications to a generic scheme and formalize the security requirements of all underlying primitives that the generic scheme is constituted. In the formalization, we introduce a new primitive called password-keyed permutation family to capture the features of the password related operations of RSA-PAKE1 and its modifications. We also show that these password related operations satisfy the security requirements of the password-keyed permutation family of the generic scheme if and only if the RSA problem is hard in the random oracle model. This also implies that RSA-PAKE2 is an instantiation of the generic scheme.
Other instantiations of the generic scheme are also possible. The most challenging problem of designing an instantiation is to devise a secure password-keyed permutation family P P K . For example, an interesting open problem is to devise one which is based on the Quadratic Residuosity Problem.
that a PPT C can be constructed to solve an instance of the RSA Problem with non-negligible probability, that is given a RSA public key (n, e) and an element y ∈ Z * n , find x ∈ Z * n such that y ≡ x e (mod n). Algorithm C uses Oracle P as a black box, but has full control over its oracles. That is, C simulates Oracle P 's view by providing 1 k , A, B ∈ {0, 1} * , a password space P W , (n, e) as A's public key, r A ∈ R {0, 1} k and answers for queries of the form T . In a non-negligible case when Oracle P successfully generates (z, r B , x 1 , x 2 , π 1 , π 2 ) such that z ≡ x e 1 · π 1 ≡ x e 2 · π 2 (mod n) for π 1 , π 2 ∈ Γ A,B,rA,rB , Oracle P queries with the form T for at least twice to generate π 1 and π 2 with probability at least 1 − 1/φ(n)
2 . Suppose C guesses correctly on these two queries. Then C picks r ∈ R Z * n , and provides r e mod n and y as answers. For all other queries of the form T , C simply picks random elements in Z * n as answers. Without loss of generality, we assume that π 1 = r e mod n and π 2 = y. 
2 · r (mod n). For C to make correct guesses of the two queries of the form T that generate π 1 and π 2 , we can see that if C makes two random guesses, the probability of guessing correctly is at least 1/Q 2 where Q is the total number of queries made by Oracle P . Therefore, C solves the instance of RSA Problem with probability at least (1 − 1/φ(n)
2 )/Q 2 of the success probability of Oracle P . 2
